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ENRON: A FINANCIAL REPORTING FAILURE?
ANTHONY H. CATANACH, JR.* & SHELLEY R.HOADES-CATANACH**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE dramatic collapse of Enron Corporation, following a series of dis-
closures of accounting improprieties, has led many to question the
soundness of current accounting and financial reporting standards.
Within Enron's reported financial statements, including related note dis-
closures, were there signs of accounting and economic issues? Should an
astute investor or analyst have been suspicious of Enron's reported results?
How did management hide debt, inflate profits and support a stock price
that considerably overstated the firm's value? Did Enron incorrectly apply
existing standards, or do these standards permit the accounting "gim-
mickry" that allowed Enron to obscure its true financial position? This
Article attempts to answer these questions by examining the two financial
reporting issues that contributed to Enron's most significant accounting
restatements: the consolidation of special purpose entities (SPEs) and the
issuance' of stock for notes receivable.
First, we examine Enron's financial performance during the ten years
prior to its declaration of bankruptcy. This analysis reveals increasing vari-
ability of key performance measures from 1997 through 2000, a time dur-
ing which Enron's stock price generally outperformed the NASDAQ
composite. Additionally, using metrics developed by Messod D. Beneish
to measure the likelihood of earnings management, we find a high
probability of earnings manipulation in Enron's financial statements for
several years preceding its bankruptcy.' These results are particularly sur-
prising because they are based on Enron's reported financial results,
which we now know were erroneous. This investigation suggests that con-
siderable evidence existed that should have lead analysts, sophisticated in-
vestors and regulators to question Enron's financial results and soaring
stock price.
Next, we briefly describe the accounting and financial reporting stan-
dards applicable to Enron's consolidation of SPEs and issuance of stock
* Associate Professor, Villanova University College of Commerce and
Finance, Department of Accountancy.
** Associate Professor, Villanova University College of Commerce and
Finance, Department of Accountancy. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
financial support and resources provided by Villanova University's College of
Commerce and Finance. The authors also thank Noah Barsky for comments and
suggestions received on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. See generally Messod Beneish, Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assess-
ing Earnings Management Among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance, 16 J. Acc-r.
& PUB. POL'Y 271 (1997).
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for notes receivable. We specifically discuss three major sets of transac-
tions in which Enron created SPEs: to hold assets, to borrow money and to
hedge fluctuations in the value of its investment activities. In each case,
we identify whether Enron's treatment of these SPEs complied with or
failed to meet the requirements of existing accounting principles. We also
discuss the impact of these transactions on Enron's true financial position
and how its reporting of these transactions obscured their economic sub-
stance. Several of these transactions involved Enron exchanging its own
stock for notes receivable from the SPEs. The financial reporting implica-
tions of these transactions are also discussed. We conclude with a sum-
mary of important issues for consideration by those setting accounting
standards.
II. ENRON'S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: WHAT DID THE MARKET SEE?
A. Reported Financial Performance: 1991-2000
Prior to its collapse in late 2001, Enron was perceived by most analysts
and investors as a company that could do no wrong. The market consid-
ered Enron's management talented and aggressive, and its business model
cutting edge and innovative. Investor demand for the company's stock
soared, pushing its stock price from almost seven dollars per share in 1990
to over eighty-three dollars per share a decade later. As Table 1 indicates,
much of the stock price increase actually occurred between October 1997
and September 2000. In fact, for all of 2000, Enron's stock even out-
performed the NASDAQ composite index, which began to stumble as
technology retreated.
What did the market see that caused it to value Enron so highly? The
company's annual financial statements may have fueled investor passions
to own Enron stock. For example, Enron's reported earnings increased
eightfold between 1997 and 2000. As Table 2 illustrates, reported operat-
ing performance in the last four years of the decade was a marked im-
provement over the preceding six years. However, Table 2 also highlights
an interesting development in Enron's performance measures. Four fi-
nancial indicators are commonly used to evaluate corporate performance:
income before extraordinary items (IBE), cash flow from operations
(CFO), comprehensive income (CI) and free cash flow (FCF). According
to Table 2, these measures generally moved in tandem between 1991 and
1996 and within a narrow range. But in 1997, these four indicators not
only diverged dramatically, but also appear to have increased in volatility.
Could this "uncoupling" have been a signal of the accounting irregulari-
ties which we now know began in 1997? Did the financial statements filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (including the ad-
mittedly erroneous reports made between 1997 and 2000) provide any
warning of the catastrophe that was about to befall investors? More impor-
tantly, how did well-educated and experienced analysts miss such a signal?
1058 [Vol. 48: p. 1057
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TAB3LE 1
ENRON STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE V. NASDAQ COMPOSITE INDEX
OCTOBER 1997 - JANUARY 2001
ENRNQ Daily- 9'06,02
.3607
..... .. ........ 630Z. . ..... .... .... . .. ... ... ;......... .. ..... iiii' i' ..... .. .. .3 o
.. . .. . .. ........ . . ...... "" . .... i *320o
.......  ... . . .......:. ... . ..  ... . .. ............... ...  ......  ... ... .. . o...
... .... v ...... .... :---, - -- -- ............ . .. - .........  -2 W7
I .. ..... , ..
... L . ' .~ .... ... :i i i .... .I........... .... . +2 0Z
*2007
+1602.
+1407
0" +21007
2007
*1607
......... ... ... .. 40%
f-.. . 4 207
-202
-407.
..... . . . I 
_60Z
... ....* * . . -0
0 N D9F M A M J J AS 0 ND F M FA M J J R S 0 N D080 F M A 0 J J A S 0 N D 01
Source: www.bigcharts.com
Note: This table compares stock price performance of Enron Corp. with the NASDAQ
composite index for the period October 1997 through January 2002. It shows that Enron
generally outperformed the NASDAQ composite from late 1997 through the end of 1999.
However, Enron significantly outperformed the NASDAQ composite during 2000.
Analysts use a variety of models and techniques to evaluate opera-
tional performance in business entities. Once such tool is the Dupont Sys-
tem of Financial Analysis.2  This simple but robust framework relies
primarily on three ratios (asset turnover, profit margin and leverage) to
help an analyst see how a firm's decisions and activities over the course of
an accounting period interact to produce an overall return to the firm's
shareholders (i.e., return on equity). Increases in all three of these ratios
suggest improved management of a firm's assets, profit margins and fi-
nancing activities, which should contribute to an overall rise in return on
equity. When applied to Enron's reported financial statement data from
1991 to 2000, Dupont System analysis provides additional insight into the
company's troubled operations. As Table 3 indicates, subsequent to the
1997 "uncoupling" noted above, Enron's return on equity plummeted into
single digits from its pre-1997 levels. Although both asset turnover and
leverage ratios staged modest recoveries between 1997 and 2000, the in-
creases were not enough to overcome a precipitous decline in the profit
margin ratio which ultimately drove return on equity down. The declines
2. See LYN M. FRASER, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 156-57 (6th ed.
2001).
2003] 1059
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TABLE 2
ENRON OPERATING PERFORMANCE 1991-2000
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Source: Research Insight supplemented with data from 10-K annual filings.
IBE-Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations.
CFO-Cash flow from operations.
Cl-Comprehensive income defined as the change in owners' equity plus dividends net
of capital contributions.
FCF-Free cash flow is measured by cash flow from operations (CFO) minus net capital
expenditures plus net interest payments.
Note: The four performance measures shown in Table 2 are commonly used by analysts
to evaluate a company's operations. The graph shows that all four performance indica-
tors closely tracked with each other between 1991 and 1996. In 1997, however, the four
measures "uncoupled," with comprehensive income and free cash flow actually diverging.
This "uncoupling" provided an "early warning" of the "earnings games" that Enron had
begun to play in 1997. The increased variation among the four performance measures
continued through 2000.
in profit margin are particularly noteworthy as they occurred during a pe-
riod of significant stock price appreciation. Could profit pressures have
created incentives for Enron's managers to engage in the type of behavior
which we now know occurred? Why did so few analysts question the obvi-
ous disparity between Enron's operating performance and its stock price
valuation? Were Enron's financial statements and the related accounting
really all that bad if they raised this many questions?
B. The Potential for Earnings Management
Many consider Enron a textbook case of earnings management.
Charles W. Mulford and Eugene E. Comiskey define earnings manage-
ment as the "active manipulation of accounting results for the purpose of
[Vol. 48: p. 10571060
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TABLE 3
DUPONT ANALYSIS OF ENRON PERFORMANCE 1991-2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Return on
Equity 11.25% 11.16% 12.03% 15.22% 15.93% 15.26% 1.57% 9.73% 8.64% 7.81%
Asset
Turnover 0.53 0.59 0.69 0.75 0.69 0.82 0.87 1.07 1.20 1.54
Profit Margin
Ratio 3.90% 4.49% 3.96% 4.88% 5.49% 4.27% 0.43% 2.19% 2.06% 0.89%
Ieverage
Ratio 5.40 4.19 4.39 4.15 4.18 4.33 4.17 4.16 3.49 5.71
Source: Research Insight supplemented with data from 10K annual filings.
Return on Equity-Net earnings or income divided by total stockholders' equity. This
measures the rate of return stockholders (owners) earn on their investment. High returns on
equity (relative to industry norms) generally are favored by stockholders.
Asset Turnover Ratio-Net sales or revenues divided by total assets. This measures a company's
efficiency in managing its assets. High asset turnover ratios (relative to industry norms)
generally are considered favorable.
Profit Margin Ratio-Operating profit divided by net sales or revenues. This measures the
profit generated by a company from its primary operations. High profit margin ratios (relative
to industry norms) generally are considered favorable.
Leverage Ratio-Total assets divided by total stockholders' equity. This measures the extent to
which a company relies on external financing (debt). High leverage ratios (relative to industry
norms) generally are considered unfavorable and signify excessive reliance on debt.
Note: The Dupont System uses the four performance measures illustrated in Table 3 to analyze
company perfonnance. The table suggests that Enron's operating performance was
significantly poorer than reflected by its stock price in Table 1. In fact, as Enron's share price
soared between 1997 and 2000, its return on equity and profit margins performed badly when
compared to pre-1996 operating levels. The disparity between Enron's stock price and its
operating performance should have raised a "warning" in the investment community.
Although post-1997 asset turnover and leverage ratio trends appear to improve, their increases
are not enough to overcome the precipitous decline experienced in the profit margin ratio.
creating an altered impression of business performance." 3 Clearly, Enron
was guilty at some level of such behavior, but were there no signals to alert
the market? In 1987, the Treadway Commission provided specific guide-
lines for assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting.4 The Com-
mission noted three primary influences on financial reporting:
performance pressures, oversight issues and changing structural condi-
tions.5 Enron displayed troubling symptoms in all three categories. For
example, Enron was a high visibility company with significant contractual
incentives (e.g., debt and stock options) that asserted enormous pressure
on management to sustain and improve operating performance. With re-
spect to oversight, the company employed complex ownership and finan-
cial structures to execute its business strategy, which made it difficult for
analysts, auditors and regulators to effectively monitor its operations. Fi-
3. See CHARLES W. MULFORD & EUGENE E. COMISKEY, THE FINANCIAL NUMBERS
GAME: DETECTING CREATIvE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES, 58-59 (2002).
4. SeeTREADWAY COMM'N, NAT'L COMM'N ON FINANCIAL REPORTING, REPORT OF
THE NAT'L COMM'N ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING App. F (Oct. 1987).
5. See id.
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nally, Enron was impacted by numerous changes in its business environ-
ment that ultimately affected its reporting. The company's innovativeness
carried it into new industries that employed new technologies, required
new financing techniques and ultimately pushed original accounting rules
to their limits. The decline in the technology sector in the late 1990s also
negatively affected the company's performance, providing additional in-
centives for management to engage in earnings manipulation.
Qualitative factors, however, such as those proposed by the Treadway
Commission are often difficult to apply. Moreover, qualitative arguments
are likely to fall on deaf ears, particularly in markets as euphoric as those
depicted in Table 1. Consequently, quantitative data must supplement
qualitative arguments when evaluating the potential for earnings manage-
ment. Historically, analysts have been content to compare balances and
ratios between years to evaluate the quality of reported financial results.
Over the last decade, however, researchers have developed more sophisti-
cated models to assess the probability of earnings manipulation. One such
technique is the Beneish probit analysis model. 6 This is a user friendly,
low cost approach yielding an earnings manipulation index that is easily
computed as a linear combination of financial variables and converted to a
"probability of manipulation."7 Beneish used several measures to capture
distortions in financial statement data in order to assess the probability of
detection." These are based on the financial statement analysis literature
and are described in Table 4.
Table 5 compares Enron's index data for the period 1995 through
2000 with that of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) vio-
lating and control firms used in Beneish.9 The gross margin index consist-
ently exceeds that of the GAAP violators between 1996 and 2000,
reflecting declining margins that may have created performance pressures
on management. Between 1995 and 1999, Enron's asset quality index also
surpassed that reported by Beneish's GAAP violators.10 For four years, the
index was greater than one, suggesting a growing tendency to defer costs.
Similarly, the depreciation index exceeded one in 1995, 1997 and 2000.
The sales growth index also signaled the potential for manipulation in
four of the six years examined. When computed, the probability of ma-
6. See Beneish, supra note 1, at 288-89 (describing use of probit estimations as
model to assess earnings manipulation).
7. See id. Beneish uses the probit model to assess the probability that a com-
pany manipulated its earnings. See id. at 289-90. To develop the model, he ex-
amined sixty-four firms known to have manipulated their financial statements
through Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) violations between
1987 and 1993. See id. at 274-82. This sample of firms was then compared to firms
that resembled the violators (large discretionary accruals and increasing sales), but
who had not been identified as having violated GAAP in their financial statements.
See id. at 278-82.
8. See id. at 274-82.
9. See id. at 276-81.
10. See id. at 285-86.
[Vol. 48: p. 10571062
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TABLE 4
BENEISH (1997) MODEL VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
DAYS SALES IN RECEIVABLES INDEXa: Measures if changes in receivables are
consistent with changes in sales. Increases suggest that either (1) more
and more sales are made on credit rather than cash, or (2) a company is
experiencing collection problems.
GROSS MARGIN INDEX': Measures whether gross margins (sales less cost of
goods sold) have declined, suggesting negative future firm prospects. In-
creases in this index signal declining margins.
ASSET QUALITY INDEX': Measures changes in quality of a company's assets
(e.g., tangible v. intangible assets). Increases in this index (i.e., a decline
in asset quality) suggest a growing tendency to capitalize intangibles or
expenses, thus deferring costs.
DEPRECIATION INDEX': Measures the change in the rate of depreciation.
Increases in this index suggest company efforts to slow depreciation to
increase earnings.
SG&A INDEX": Measures sales, general and administrative expenses
(SG&A) relative to sales. Increases suggest loss of managerial cost control
or unusual sales efforts. However, significant declines may also signal ma-
nipulation if sales are materially distorted.
TOTAL ACCRUALS TO TOTAL SALES: Measures the extent to which earnings
are cash based. High increases in non-cash working capital may reflect
possible manipulation.
SALES GROWTH INDEX: Measures the growth in sales between periods. The
index may reflect earnings manipulation because research suggests that
high-growth firm stock prices may be sensitive to news that may give the
impression that growth is slowing.
ABNORMAL RETURN: Companies that underperform their peer group (e.g.,
declining stock prices) have incentives to violate GAAP. This measure
quantifies the performance difference (size adjusted return) of Enron
with its peer group of companies.
LEVERAGE INDEX: Measures the company's total debt relative to assets at
the beginning of the fiscal year. High values may identify companies
whose managers have incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid debt cov-
enant violations.
PROBABILITY OF MANIPULATION: Using coefficients from the Beneish (1997)
probit analyis, an earnings manipulation index is computed. The index is
then converted into a probability of manipulation using a standard normal
distribution table. The median estimated probability of manipulation of
GAAP violation from the model was 0.095 and 0.011 for control firms.
'This measure has an expected value of 1.0 reflecting the assumption that relation-
ships between certain financial statement items remain constant over time.
20031 1063
7
Catanach and Rhoades-Catanach: Enron: A Financial Reporting Failure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
1064 VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48: p. 1057
TABLE 5
EARNINGS MANIPULATION INDICATORS FROM BENEISH (1997)
GAAP Control
Ratios' 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Violators' Firms'
Days Sales in
Receivables Index 1.644" 0.989 0.625 0.872 0.955 1.376* 1.269 1.199
Gross Margin
Index 1.027 1.263* 1.447* 2.015* 1.169* 2.143* 1.042 1.004
Asset Quality 0
Index 0.992* 1.136* 1.308* 1.062* 1.064* 0.771 .937 .807
Depreciation
Index 1.039* 0.946 1.017* 0.852 0.956 1.109* .981 1.021
SG&A Index 1.059* 0.806 0.648 1.084* 1.008* 0.416* .997 .981
Total Accruals to
Total Assets 0.010 -0.039 -0.005 -0.040 0.027 0.001 .204 .441
Sales Growth
Index 1.022 1.446* 1.525* 1.541* 1.283 2.512* 1.431 1.379
Abnormal Return 0.232 -1.337* 0.102 0.742 -0.534* -1.271* -. 325 0.011
Leverage Index 0.426 0.415 0.437 0.455 0.458 0.416 .564 .500
Probability of
Manipulation 0.018 0.257** 0.035 0.024 0.087 0.392**
Note: The first five ratios (days sales in receivables, gross margin, asset quality, depreciation
and SG&A) all have an expected value of 1.0 reflecting the assumption that relationships
between certain financial statement items should remain constant over time. All of the indexes
(excluding total accruals to total assets and abnormal return) are constructed with the
expectation of being positively related to the probability of manipulation.
See Table 3 for index definitions.
'These are median measure values for the GAAP violators in Beneish (1997). They include 64
firms known, during the period 1987-1993, to have manipulated their financial statements
through violations of GAAP.
' Median measures for a sample of firms in Bencish (1997) that resemble the GAAP violators
but that were not identified as having violated GAAP in their financial statements.
* Ratio indicates possible earnings manipulation when compared to Beneish (1997) GAAP
violator median ratios or historical trend for the company.
** Probability of manipulation exceeds the median found for Beneish (1997) GAAP Violators
(0.095), suggesting possible earnings manipulation in the year indicated.
nipulation was quite high in 1996 and 2000 (over twenty-five percent)."
Thus, Enron's reported numbers appear to have provided ample warning
to the potential for earnings management. These findings suggest that
Enron's major problem may not have been in the reporting of numbers, but
rather in the lack of oversight that should have been provided by analysts,
auditors, institutional investors and regulators. Nevertheless, Table 5
clearly indicates that Enron's numbers were suspect. The next two sec-
tions shed light on the extent of the major, non-subjective accounting ir-
11. The median estimated probability of GAAP violators in the Beneish
model was 9.5 percent and 1.1 percent for control firms. See id. at 291. Selecting
the appropriate cutoff point, however, depends on the analyst's purpose. For ex-
ample, Beneish found that using a probability cutoff of 2.94 percent resulted in
the correct classification of eighty-three percent of GAAP violators in his sample.
See id. Conversely, using an 11.72 percent probability cutoff resulted in only cor-
rectly classifying forty-five percent of GAAP violators. See id.
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regularities that impacted Enron's financial performance subsequent to
1996.
III. THE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING RULES
Many of the accounting and financial reporting issues related to En-
ron deal with the treatment of SPEs. SPEs may take the legal form of a
trust, partnership or corporation, and are established for a specific pur-
pose or a specific business activity, typically for the benefit of a single com-
pany (often referred to as the SPE's sponsor). The SPE's activities are
typically limited in scope, often to a single activity such as leasing, securi-
tization, hedging, research and development or reinsurance. These activi-
ties are often predetermined by the documents creating the entity or by
contracts between the parties involved.
A. Consolidation Rules
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 51 (ARB 51) provides general rules for combining
the financial results of related entities.' 2 ARB 51 states that consolidated
financial statements are "usually necessary for a fair presentation when
one of the companies in the group directly or indirectly has a controlling
financial interest in the other companies." 13 ARB 51 defines a controlling
financial interest as "a majority voting interest."14 Thus, a company and
any entity in which that company has greater than fifty percent voting con-
trol would file consolidated financial statements reflecting the assets, lia-
bilities, revenues and expenses of each member of the consolidated
group.
Application of ARB 51 to SPEs is problematic in many cases because
the parties involved in an SPE may not control its activities through voting
equity interests. For example, the activities of an SPE formed as a trust are
controlled by the trust document under the direction of a trustee. Benefi-
ciaries of the trust have no voting rights or control over trust activities. In
an SPE formed as a partnership, limited partners are prohibited from par-
ticipating in partnership management; activities are directed by a general
partner or partners, subject to the terms of the partnership agreement.
During the last decade, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) has considered the treatment of SPEs used in particular activities
but has not promulgated general guidance regarding when SPEs should
be consolidated for financial reporting purposes. The FASB's Emerging
Issues Task Force (EITF) issued regulatory opinion EITF 90-15 to address
12. See generally CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 51 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1959).
13. Id. § 1.
14. Id. § 2.
2003] 1065
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the use of SPEs in leasing transactions. 15 Among other factors, EITF 90-15
indicated that an SPE lessor should be consolidated with a lessee when
"[t]he owner(s) of record of the SPE has not made an initial substantive
residual equity capital investment that is at risk during the entire term of
the lease."1 6 In applying this test, the Task Force indicated that three per-
cent was the minimum acceptable investment by owners other than the
lessee.' 7 Although EITF 90-15 focused on leasing transactions, the staff of
the SEC in its comments to the EITF indicated that the conditions set
forth in EITF 90-15 might be "useful in evaluating other transactions in-
volving SPEs."' 8 Thus, EITF 90-15 provides the underlying authority by
which Enron and many other corporations structured SPEs to avoid con-
solidation by obtaining three percent outside investment.
B. Equity Method of Accounting
When an SPE is not consolidated with another entity, investments in
the SPE are recorded using the equity method of accounting under the
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 18 (APB 18).19 In addition,
transactions between the SPE and its investors are recorded in the finan-
cial statements as if between independent parties.
Under APB 18, the equity method of accounting is appropriate when
an investor exercises "significant influence over operating and financial
policies of an investee even though the investor holds 50% or less of the
voting stock."2°1 Under the equity method of accounting, the investor
records its initial investment in the investee at cost and the carrying
amount of the investment is adjusted to recognize the investor's share of
the investee's earnings or losses after the date of the investment.2 1 The
investment is shown on the investor's balance sheet as a single amount;
the investor's share of earnings and losses from the investment is shown
on its income statement as a single amount.22
C. Issuance of Stock for Notes
Many of Enron's SPEs held Enron stock. In some cases, stock was
issued by the corporation to the SPE in exchange for notes. The regula-
15. See IMPACT OF NONSUBSTANTIVE LESSORS, RESIDUAL VALUE GUARANTEES,
AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN LEASING TRANSACTIONS, Emerging Issues Task Force Is-
sue No. 90-15 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1990).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See generally EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENTS IN COMMON
STOCK, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 18 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1971) (approving and clarifying application of equity method of ac-
counting to common stock investments).
20. Id. § 17.
21. See id. § 19.
22. See id. (describing generally equity method of accounting as applied to
common stock investments).
1066 [Vol. 48: p. 1057
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tory opinion EITF 85-1 addresses the recording of such stock issuances by
the corporation.2 3 The task force concluded that recording the note as an
asset is generally not appropriate. 24 Instead, the note should be offset
against the stock in the equity section of the balance sheet.25 The treat-
ment of this transaction in EITF 85-1 is consistent with the SEC's Staff
Accounting Bulletin 40 (SAB 40), applicable to public companies.26
IV. ENRON'S MANIPULATION OF EARNINGS AND EQUITY
As previously illustrated in Table 2, Enron's performance measures
appear to have "uncoupled" beginning in 1997. Clearly, "aggressive" ac-
counting may have played a role in the increased volatility witnessed
among IBE, CFO, CI and FCF subsequent to 1996.27 This section reviews
Enron's failure to comply with the provisions of EITF 90-15 as it relates to
the consolidation of its SPEs, which ultimately distorted financial perform-
ance between 1997 and 2000. Enron's practice of recording equity for
stock issuances to its SPEs is also discussed.
A. Non-Consolidation of SPEs
1. Joint Energy Development Investments LP (]EDI) and the Chewco SPE
Between 1993 and 1996, Enron and the California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS) were fifty percent joint-venture partners in
the Joint Energy Development Investments (JEDI) limited partnership.2 8
Enron (the general partner) and CalPERS (the limited partner) each ini-
23. See CLASsIFYING NOTES RECEIVED FOR CAPITAL STOCK, Emerging Issues Task
Force Issue No. 85-1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 40, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,501
(Jan. 23, 1981).
27. See Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Accounting;
Fuzzy Rules of Accounting & Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl (suggesting En-
ron may have complied with GAAP in even some of its most widely questioned
accounting practices). In fact, Enron's financial reporting recently has been criti-
cized in a number of areas that may have actually complied with GAAP: revenue
recognition on energy trading contracts and securitized asset sales (e.g., the
Braveheart partnership). In such cases, which often involved complex financial
structured transactions, it appears that earnings were recorded incorrectly either
because of inadequate accounting regulation (i.e., vague accounting and report-
ing guidance), poor management estimates or a combination of the two. See id.
(explaining that "when accounting rules are written very specifically, clever ac-
countants find ways to get around them... [, but w]hen, as in this case, they are
written far more generally, proper accounting can be overtly reliant on the good
faith of companies and auditors in applying the rules"). For purposes of a more
meaningful analysis, therefore, this Article focuses only on those transactions
where the accounting rules were clear and where the role of management judg-
ment or interpretation was small.
28. See WILLIAM C. POWERS,JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE COMMIrEE OF
THE BOARD OF DIREcToRs OF ENRON CORP. 42 (Feb. 1, 2002), availabe at 2002 WL
198018 [hereinafter PowERS REPORT] (recounting formation of JEDI).
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tially contributed $250 million to JEDI to fund a variety of investment
transactions. 29 Because Enron did not have a controlling interest (greater
than fifty percent) in the limited partnership during this three year pe-
riod, JEDI's assets and liabilities were not required to be included in the
company's balance sheet.-0 Additionally, Enron recognized income (or
loss) forJEDI only to the extent of its ownership percentage (fifty percent)
as required by APB 18.
In 1997, CalPERS sought to liquidate its investment in JEDI in order
to pursue another investment opportunity.3 ' To accommodate CaIPERS's
wishes, Enron created a new investment partnership to purchase
CalPERS's fifty percent limited partner investment.32 Enron funded this
new partnership, Chewco Investments LP (Chewco), with $383.5 million
from the following sources: a $240 million unsecured subordinated loan
to Chewco from Barclays Bank PLC (guaranteed by Enron), a $132 mil-
lion advance from JEDI to Chewco under a revolving credit agreement
and $11.5 million in equity from Chewco's general and limited partners
(Big River LLC and Little River LLC). 33 Chewco subsequently purchased
CalPERS's interest using these funds.3 4
JEDI continued to be reported as an unconsolidated entity at the end
of 1997. 3 5 This treatment was based on the assertion that Chewco owned
fifty percent of JEDI, thus precluding Enron from having a "controlling
interest" which would trigger consolidation of JEDI. Accordingly, Enron
continued to record fifty percent ofJEDI's income and losses in its income
statement.
3 6
However, several Enron-related loan guarantees associated with the
initial funding of Chewco made this treatment inappropriate. When
Chewco was initially formed as an SPE, Enron carefully crafted its capitali-
zation such that it would not have to be consolidated into Enron's finan-
29. See id. (explaining Enron contributed $250 million in Enron stock and
CalPERS contributed $250 million in cash).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 43-44 (describing circumstances under which Enron bought out
CalPERS's interest in JEDI).
32. See id. (recounting Enron's creation of Chewco to purchase interest in
JEDI).
33. See id. at 49-50 (explaining Chewco's capital structure).
34. See id. at 45 ("Enron ... put together a bridge financing agreement,
under which Chewco and its members would borrow $383 million from two banks
on an unsecured basis to buy CalPERS' [s] interest from JEDI.").
35. See SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 1997, Enron Corp.,
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-98-000009.
txt (listingJEDI as unconsolidated entity).
36. See PowERs REPORT, supra note 28, at 59-60 (discussing Enron's repur-
chase and consolidation ofJedi). It should be noted thatJEDI also owned Enron
stock and recognized gains on its appreciation. By using the equity method of
accounting, Enron was able to report revenues related to the price appreciation of
its own stock. See id. at 60 (providing reasons for Enron's repurchase ofJedi from
Chewco).
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cial statements either. Enron made sure that Chewco's investors (Big
River LLC and Little River LLC) appeared to meet the three percent "at
risk" provisions of EITF 90-15. However, the investors' entire $11.5 mil-
lion investment was funded by Barclays Bank PLC, which required that
$16.6 million of the loan be secured by a reserve provided byJEDI.37 Be-
cause Enron owned fifty percent of JEDI, Enron effectively guaranteed
$3.3 million of the Chewco investors' contribution. This meant that the
investors in reality had less than three percent of their monies "at risk"-
thus failing EITF 90-15's test. Moreover, since Enron guaranteed most of
Chewco's debt and also shared in substantially all of Chewco's risks and
rewards, EITF 90-15 required that Chewco be consolidated into Enron's
financial statements. Requiring Chewco's consolidation resulted in Enron
(the consolidated entity) effectively owning (and controlling) 100 percent
of JEDI.38 Enron, therefore, should have also consolidated JEDI. 3
9
The effects on Enron's balance sheets and income statements were
dramatic. As indicated in Table 6, Enron overstated net income and stock-
holders' equity by a total of $405 million between 1997 and 2000 because
of its failure to properly consolidate both JEDI and Chewco in its financial
statements. 40 Furthermore, failure to correctly apply EITF 90-15 resulted
in an understatement of liabilities on Enron's balance sheet by amounts
ranging from $561 million to $711 million during the same period. 41
2. The Rhythms Hedging SPE
In March 1998, Enron purchased a $10 million investment in
Rhythms NetConnections, Inc. (Rhythms), a privately-held internet service
provider (ISP) for businesses using digital subscriber line (DSL) technol-
ogy.42 In April 1999, Rhythms went public and within a month, Enron's
investment in Rhythms had soared to $300 million. 43 However, logistical
problems prohibited Enron from selling its shares before year end.4 4
Since the Rhythms investment was carried at market value in Enron's bal-
ance sheet, changes in the price of Rhythms stock were reported in En-
37. See id. at 50-51 ("In order to fund the reserve accounts, JEDI made a spe-
cial $16.6 million distribution to Chewco.").
38. See id. at 41-44 (discussing Enron's motivation for forming Chewco and
subsequent accounting mistakes it made when it chose not to consolidate
Chewco).
39. See id. at 52 ("Chewco should have been consolidated into Enron's consol-
idated financial statements from the outset .... ).
40. See id. at 42 (describing financial impact of failure to properly consolidate
JEDI and Chewco).
41. See id. (describing impact of non-consolidation on Enron liabilities).
42. See id. at 77 (describing Enron's investment in Rhythms).
43. See id. ("By May 1999, Enron's investment in Rhythms was worth approxi-
mately $300 million .... ).
44. See id. (explaining that Enron was prohibited from selling its shares due to
lock-up agreement).
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF ENRON'S ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING ADJUSTMENTS
(000'S)
Stockholders'] Net . Return on Debt to EPS
Transaction Assets Liabilities Equity Income Assets Equity IEPS.] Change
1997 Reported
Balances
Chewco &Jedi
1997 Corrected
Balances
1998 Reported
Balances
Prior period
corrections
Clewco & Jedi
1998 Corrected
Balances
1999 Reported
Balances
Prior period
corrections
Chewco &Jedi
Rhythms
1999 Corrected
Balances
2000 Reported
Balances
Prior period
corrections
Chewco &Jedi
Rhythms
Raptors:
Consolidation
Effects
Stock for Note
Effects
2000 Corrected
Balances
22,552,000 16,934,000
683,000 711,000
23,235,000 117,645,000
5,618,000 105,000
(28,000) (28,000)
77,000
+ I
5,590,000
0.47%
0.33% 3.16 10.141-26.67%
29,350,000 22,302,000 7,048,000 703,000 2.40% 3.16 1.10
(28,000) (28,000)
428,000 561,000 (133,000) (133,000)
29,750,000 22,863,000 6,887,000 570,000 1.92% 3.32 0.89 -18.92%
33,381,000 23,811,000 9,570,000 893,000 2.68% 2.49 1.27
(161,000) (161,000)
532,000 685,000 (153,000) (153,000)
(95,000) (95,000) (95,000)
33,657,000 24,496,000 9,161,000 645,000 1.92% 2.67 0.91 -27.77%
65,503,000
(409,000)
537,000
(8,000)
(532,000)
(172,000)
64,919,000
54,033,000
628,000
54,661,000
11,470,000
(409,000)
(91,000)
(8,000)
(532,000)
(172,000)
979,000
(91,000)
(8,000)
(532,000)
10,258,000 1348,000
1.49%
0.54% 5.33 0.47 1-64.45%
Note: 2001 adjustments for Raptors' consolidation reduced net income and stockholders' equity by
$545,000,000. 2001 adjustments for Raptors' stock/note exchanges reduced assets and stockholders
equity by $828,000,000.
" EPS signifies earnings per share. Numbers differ from reported EPS as net income has not be
reduced for preferred stock dividends not available to common shareholders.
ron's income statement.4 5 The company wanted to "lock in" its gains on
the Rhythms stock and protect itself from any price depreciation, while
hedging a position that large and commercially illiquid was considered too
costly.4 6 In June 1999, therefore, Enron decided to hedge against the po-
45. See id. (noting effect of value of Rhythms stock on Enron's income
statement).
46. See id. at 78 ("Given the size of Enron's position, the relative illiquidity of
Rhythms stock, and the lack of comparable securities in the marks, it would have
been virtually impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to hedge Rhythms
commercially.").
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tential price volatility of its Rhythms investment using an SPE named LJM
Swap Sub, LP (Swab Sub). 4 7 This was the first of many SPEs that Enron
allegedly created for hedging purposes.
Enron contributed 3.4 million shares of its own stock to Swap Sub's
limited partner, who in turn used 1.6 million shares of Enron's stock (and
$3.75 million in cash) to provide the three percent outside equity "at risk"
required by EITF 90-15 to prevent consolidation. 4 8 Swap Sub subse-
quently gave Enron a put option on 5.4 million shares of Rhythms stock. 4
9
If the Rhythms stock declined in value, the put option would increase in
value, thus protecting Enron from price volatility of the Rhythms stock.
Given the structure of the Swap Sub SPE (i.e., Enron stock was its princi-
pal asset), Enron was using its own stock to hedge its Rhythms investment.
Enron hoped that price appreciation in its own stock would generate suffi-
cient funds to allow Swap Sub to make good on Enron's put option should
the price of Rhythms stock decline.
For reasons that remain unknown, at its formation inJune 1999, Swap
Sub's liability (the $104 million Enron put option) greatly exceeded its
assets ($3.75 million in cash and $80 million in Enron stock).5 01 Swap Sub,
therefore, had no equity and failed EITF 90-15's three percent "at risk"
equity test. Enron should have consolidated Swap Sub, but it did not.5 1
As Table 6 indicates, Enron's failure to consolidate Swap Sub (the correct
application of EITF 90-15 in the Rhythms hedge transaction) overstated
net income (and stockholders' equity) by a total of $103 million in 1999
and 2000.52 These income declines essentially reflect "unhedged" price
decreases in the value of Rhythms stock during this two-year period.
3. The Raptors Hedging SPEs
In April 2000, Enron extended the hedging methodology used for its
Rhythms investment to its merchant investment portfolio.5 3 As in the case
of the Rhythms securities, the merchant investments (primarily high-tech-
nology and energy stocks) had increased in value dramatically and price
changes were reflected quarterly in the company's financial statements.
47. See id. at 79 (stating purposes for using Swap Sub).
48. See id. at 80 (reporting finance transactions involved with use of Swap
Sub).
49. See id. at 81 (stating that put option was valued at approximately $104
million).
50. See id. at 83 (noting that on June 30, 1999, Swap Sub had negative equity).
51. See id. (explaining Arthur Andersen's initial error in calculating percent-
age of residual equity level to qualify for non-consolidation). Apparently, Arthur
Andersen erroneously approved Swap Sub for non-consolidation. See id. (stating
that accounting mistake made Enron's net earnings for 1999 $95 million too
high).
52. See id. at 84 (positing effect of restating prior period financial statements
to reflect consolidation).
53. See id. at 97 ("Expanding on the concepts underlying the Rhythms transac-
tion . . ., Enron sought to use the 'embedded' value of its merchant investments.").
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Again, commercial hedging vehicles were not considered practical by En-
ron management. Thus, over the next several months, Enron created four
new, much larger SPEs (Talon, Timberwolf, Porcupine and Bobcat, re-
ferred to collectively as the Raptors) to handle its hedging transactions. 54
The general structure of each transaction is outlined in Table 7.
TABLE 7
COMMON STRUCTURE OF SPE TRANSACTION100%
Owned
Enron Enron
Corp. 1, Subsidiary
p tn EnronPu % \Stock
Option sSubsidiary.ote
i Special PurposeEntity (SPE)A
Ousde
inetor
For all the Raptors, the three percent outside "at risk" investment
needed to avoid consolidation was provided by LJM2 Co-Investment, LP
(LJM2), a partnership run by Andrew Fastow, Enron's Chief Financial Of-
ficer. " LJM2 transferred $30 million to each Raptor SPE as its initial in-
vestmengt.5 6 For each SPE (except Porcupine, also known as Raptor w n),
Enron contributed its own stock and a promissory note via a 100 percent
Enron-owned subsidiary. 57  Each of these three Raptors (Talon,
Timberwolf and Bobcat) delivered a put option to Enron.5 1 As in the
Rhythms transaction, Enron attempted to hedge value declines in its
merchant portfolio with its own stock's appreciation. In Porcupine's case,
54. See id. (discussing circumstances surrounding creation of Raptors).
55. See K. Kranhold et al., Following the Trail: As Enron Inquiy Intensifies,
Midlevel Players Face Spotlight-They Could Help Prosecutors Build a Criminal Case
Against Top Executives-Seven Areas of Vulnerability, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at Al
(describing fashion in which partnership supplied Raptors with money).
56. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 28, at 100, 117, 128.
57. See id. at 100, 111.
58. See id. at 103, 113.
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Enron contributed TNPC stock (a residential and commercial power deliv-
ery company created by Enron), rather than Enron stock, to hedge its
investment in The New Power Company (TNPC) stock.5 9 Clearly, the put
option Enron received from Porcupine was not a "true" economic hedge
as price movements of the put option (secured by TNPC stock) would
parallel that of the hedged asset (also TNPC stock).60
Shortly after the four Raptors were formed, each transferred approxi-
mately $40 million back to LJM2. 6 1 Enron contended these transfers,
made within weeks of each SPE's initial formation, were simply a return on
LJM2's initial $30 million "at risk" investment.62 However, statements by
Mr. Fastow to his limited partners in LJM2 in April 2001 suggest that these
transfers may have been both a "return of and return on capital." 6 3 In
fact, he indicated to these investors that LJM2's investment was "not at
risk" anymore. 64 If accurate, then all of the Raptor SPEs failed EITF 90-
15's three percent "at risk" test and should have been consolidated into
Enron's financial statements. The effects of not consolidating the Raptors
on Enron's balance sheets and income statements were awesome. As indi-
cated in Table 6, net income and stockholders' equity were overstated by a
total of $1.077 billion in 2000 and 2001 by Enron's failure to properly
consolidate the Raptors in its financial statements.
65
4. Stock for Note Exchange Transactions
The accounting treatment accorded the "stock for note exchanges"
that took place when three of the Raptor SPEs (Talon, Timberwolf and
Bobcat) were formed also violated GAAP. The exchanges occurred be-
tween 100 percent owned Enron subsidiaries and the three Raptor SPEs,
resulting in the same outcome as if Enron itself had executed the transac-
tion. Enron accounted for the "sale" of its own shares to the three SPEs in
2000 and the first quarter of 2001 by increasing its notes receivable and
shareholders' equity.6 6 This treatment was inconsistent with the guidance
provided in the accounting literature, both EITF 85-1 and SAB 40, which
require that notes received in payment for stock be reported as a deduc-
tion from shareholders' equity. According to Table 6, this GAAP violation
59. See id. at 114.
60. See id. Unlike the other Raptor transactions, Porcupine was not presented
to the Board or to any of its Committees. See id. at 116.
61. See id. at 104, 113, 117.
62. See Kranhold et al., supra note 55, at Al; see also PowERs REPORT, supra
note 28, at 128-29.
63. PowERs REPORT, supra note 28, at 130.
64. See Kranhold et al., supra note 55, at Al.
65. See PowERs REPORT, supra note 28, at 132.
66. See id. at 125. Enron's 2001 second quarter 10Qfiling reports the increase
in notes receivable in "[i]nvestments in and advances to unconsolidated equity
affiliates." Id. Enron's no par, common stock reflects a similar increase. See id.
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alone overstated assets and shareholders' equity by $1 billion: $172 million
in 2000 and $828 million in the first half of 2001.67
5. Cumulative Impact of Financial Statement Errors
In all of the transactions described in the preceding section, Enron's
financial reporting treatment failed to comply with existing accounting
standards. Table 8 summarizes all of Enron's major GAAP violations. The
impact of these failures on Enron's financial statements is summarized in
Table 6. Over the four years from 1997 through 2000, Enron overstated
reported net income in total by $1.577 billion. Furthermore, Enron over-
stated reported shareholders' equity in total by $2.585 billion. Although
Enron declared bankruptcy prior to year-end 2001, reports indicate that
its quarterly reports for 2001 overstated net income and shareholders' eq-
uity by $545 million and $828 million, respectively. 68
These overstatements impacted measures of Enron's financial health
in important respects. Restatement of Enron's net income decreased its
earnings per share (EPS) by amounts ranging from nineteen percent of
reported EPS in 1998 to sixty-four percent of reported EPS in 2000.69 In
addition, these restatements increased Enron's debt-to-equity ratios in all
four years, with a high of 5.33 in 2000. Finally, the restatements decreased
Enron's return-on-assets (ROA) in every year, with a reduction of nearly
two-thirds in 2000.70
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
While the implications of Enron's accounting errors for its financial
position are clear, conclusions regarding the adequacy of existing account-
ing standards are less apparent. In each of the cases discussed above, En-
ron violated existing financial reporting standards and SEC reporting
regulations. Following the collapse of Enron, many argued that inade-
quate accounting principles were at fault.7' Yet, Enron's financial state-
ments did not conform to existing accounting standards, suggesting that
the standards themselves were not at fault. While the recent focus on fi-
nancial reporting requirements may bring about needed changes and im-
provements in the quality of financial information provided to investors,
current standards should not be blamed for Enron's failure.
Had existing standards been correctly applied, particularly with re-
spect to consolidation of the SPEs, Enron's financial statements would
67. See id.
68. See POWERs REPORT, supra note 28, at 125, 127.
69. For a further explanation, see Table 6.
70. EPS, ROA and debt-to-equity ratios were recalculated by the authors using
Enron's publicly available financial reports.
71. See, e.g., J. Weil, What Enron s Financial Reports Did-and Didn 't-Reveal-
Auditor Could Face Scrutiny on Clarity of Financial Reports, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at
CI.
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF MAJOR ENRON GAAP VIOLATIONS
CONSOLIDATION RULES
EITF 90-15 required consolidated reporting of SPEs when "the
owner(s) of record of the SPE has not made an initial substantive
residual equity capital investment that is at risk." In applying this test,
the EITF indicated that three percent was the minimum acceptable
investment by outside owners.
Enron failed the three percent "at risk" threshold in five separate
cases:
Chewco and JEDI: Over half of Chewco's three percent partners' invest-
ment was secured byJEDI, which was 50 percent
owned by Enron. This meant that the outside investors
did not have the entire three percent "at risk." Enron
did not consolidate either Chewco or JEDI.
Rhythms: At the date of formation, the SPE's liabilities exceeded
its assets. Thus, the entity had no equity and it was
impossible for the investors to have any investment "at
risk." Nevertheless, Enron reported the Rhythms SPE
as an unconsolidated entity.
Talon (Raptor I) In each of these transactions, investors received a
Timberwolf (Raptor II) return on and of their capital within weeks of the
Porcupine (Raptor III) SPE's formation. This meant that outside investors did
Bobcat (Raptor IV) not have any of their three percent "at risk" once the
entity began its hedging activities. Nonetheless, Enron
continued to report these SPEs as unconsolidated enti-
ties.
ISSUANCE OF STOCK FOR NOTES RECEIVABLE
EITF 85-1 and SAB 40 require that notes received in payment for
stock be reported as a deduction from shareholders' equity.
Talon (Raptor I) In each of these transactions, Enron used a wholly
Timberwolf (Raptor 11) owned subsidiary to exchange Enron stock for an SPE's
Bobcat (Raptor IV) note receivable. Furthermore, Enron accounted for
these transactions by increasing both notes receivable
and shareholders' equity.
have more accurately reflected the underlying economic substance of its
activities. Alternatively, had Enron legitimately secured a three percent
butside equity investment that was at risk for the entire term of the SPE,
existing accounting standards would not have required consolidation.
One must ask, however, whether the three percent outside equity investors
would have permitted Enron to engage in the transactions that occurred
in these SPEs. In total, the required three percent equity investment in
Chewco and the Raptors totaled $131.5 million. 72 It is unlikely that inde-
72. See generally K. Kranhold et al., supra note 55, at Al. Because of valuation
issues and Swap Sub's negative equity at formation, it is unclear what investment
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pendent outside investors would have been willing to risk these dollars in
investments that were purely speculative, did not represent true economic
hedges and were created only to remove assets and debt from Enron's
balance sheet while inflating Enron's reported net income.
Enron's financial reporting failures attempted to create an erroneous
image of financial health. Yet, this Article's analysis illustrates that Enron's
incorrect financial statements signaled serious problems regarding En-
ron's financial condition. Why were these signals largely ignored? The
collapse of Enron has implications for the functioning of business and
capital markets far beyond financial reporting standards and accountants'
responsibilities. In particular, it raises questions regarding: (1) the over-
sight responsibilities of Enron's board of directors, (2) the financial advis-
ers that assisted the company in structuring its SPEs, (3) the banks and
other lenders that provided "off balance sheet" financing and (4) the bro-
kers, analysts and other investment advisers that ignored the warning signs
of trouble apparent in Enron's financial reports. All of these parties ac-
tively assisted Enron's management in its efforts to distort fair presenta-
tion of the company's financial condition. Recent congressional
investigations indicate that Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and
federal regulators all share blame in facilitating Enron's financial manipu-
lations. 73 Thus, non-accounting solutions are required as well. What pol-
icy, legal and regulatory changes are needed to ensure adequate oversight
in monitoring the activities and reports of aggressive, cutting-edge busi-
nesses like Enron? Is the severity or enforcement of existing penalties suf-
ficient? Or are additional professional, regulatory, civil and criminal
sanctions and penalties needed to motivate all involved parties to act
responsibly in the interest of all market participants? The failure of En-
ron, initially attributed to accounting and reporting inadequacies, contin-
ues to raise broader issues of corporate governance and regulation that
will likely be the subject of much debate in years to come.
would have been required to meet the three percent equity rule in the Rhythms
transaction. See PowEas REPORT, supra note 28, at 84.
73. SeeJ. Fialka, Jurisdiction Issues May Have Put off Action on Enron, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 12, 2002, at A2; G.R. Simpson &J. Sapsford, Banks'Enron Deals Draw Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2002, at Al1.
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